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Abstract
Privacy is under threat from artificial intelligence revolution fueled by unprecedented abundance of
data. Differential privacy, an established candidate for privacy protection, is susceptible to adversarial
attacks, acts conservatively, and leads to miss-implementations because of lacking systematic methods
for setting its parameters (known as the privacy budget). An alternative is information-theoretic privacy
using entropy with the drawback of requiring prior distribution of the private data. Here, by using the
Fisher information, information-theoretic privacy framework is extended to avoid unnecessary assump-
tions on the private data. The optimal privacy-preserving additive noise, extracted by minimizing the
Fisher information, must follow the time-independent Schro¨dinger’s equation. A fundamental trade-off
between privacy and utility is also proved, reminiscent of the Heisenberg uncertainty principle.
1 Introduction
Privacy, defined as control over knowledge about oneself [14], is an important part of personal liberty, moral
autonomy, and democracy [24, 17]. This notion has been increasingly under threat by artificial intelligence
in the era of big data [27, 24], which motivates the need for development of methods for preserving privacy of
individuals. The roll out of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), the legal text of the Regulation
(EU) 2016/679, will undoubtedly further fuel the privacy research by industry so that corporations can recruit
and maintain a larger set of customers willing to share their private data under proper guarantees.
Researchers at Microsoft developed the notion of differential privacy in mid-2000s as a methodology for
responding to online queries on private datasets in a privacy-preserving manner [10, 9], following negative
results establishing impossibility of publishing outcomes of arbitrary aggregative queries on private databases
without revealing private sensitive information [7, 6]. Differential privacy, roughly speaking, requires that
the output a query on a dataset should be systematically corrupted, for instance by an additive noise, so
that its statistics do not significantly change by changing the private data of one individual; hence rending
the problem of reverse engineering the private dataset over which the queries were computed hopeless.
Differential privacy has proved to be an extremely popular methodology [11], even extending beyond
research to government organizations and private corporations [2, 1]. Even ignoring susceptibility of differ-
ential privacy to adversarial attacks [19], the notions is fairly conservative [3, 25, 16]. Further, because of
the lack of a systematic way for setting the so-called “privacy parameter”, differential privacy has shown to
be ineffective in practice [18, 30].
Another approach for ensuring privacy is to use information or estimation theory metrics in order to
measure private information leakage when responding to queries on private datasets [22, 5, 23]. These studies
date back to wiretap channels [31] and their extensions [32]. Information-theoretic measures of privacy rely
on mutual information (or relative entropy) for measuring private information leakage and cast the privacy
problem as a generalized rate-distortion problem [22]. Although possessing physical interpretations for
privacy and offering strong guarantees, the use of entropy as a measure of privacy forces the private dataset
to be statistically distributed with known distributions. This is the biggest shortfall of information-theoretic
privacy because it introduces information asymmetry between the adversary and the curator (denoting those
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who are burdened with protecting data privacy) with potential for devastating mistakes by the curator due
to misinformation.
This motivates the extension of information-theoretic privacy to use the Fisher information, from the
estimation theory, as measure of private information leakage. This is because the Fisher information does
not require strong statistical assumptions on the private dataset.
2 Problem Formulation
Here we model a dataset with vector x ∈ Rn. Assume that a m-dimensional query f : Rn → Rm is provided
to the curator for execution on the dataset x. The curator, instead of directly releasing the outcome f(x),
provides a noisy response as in
y = f(x) + w, (1)
where w is an additive noise with density function pw : W → R with W ⊆ Rm denoting the support
set of the additive noise. The support set can capture the noises that are sensible in practice in order to
avoid absurd outputs. This is a feature that is entirely missing from differential privacy [3]. The Crame´r-
Rao bound [4, 28, 20] shows that the quality of an adversary’s estimate of the private dataset x based on
measurement y in (1) denoted by xˆ(y) is bounded by
E{‖x− xˆ(y)‖2
2
} ≥ α(x)
I
, (2)
where α(x) is a term that is a function of the Jacobian of f(x) and I is the Fisher information of the additive
noise defined as
I = E
{∥∥∥∥ ∂∂w log(pw(w))
∥∥∥∥
2
2
}
. (3)
This bound is valid of unbiased estimators, E{xˆ(y)} = x, but it can be easily generalized to biased estimators
with some additional terms [4, 28]. Intuitively, the most private action can be extracted by maximizing the
adversary’s estimation error E{‖x − xˆ(y)‖2
2
} but this is a function of the actions of the adversary, namely
its estimator xˆ(y). In a real world, we do not know the adversary and thus need to be prepared for the
worst-case scenario. Therefore, minimizing I can capture the most privacy-preserving additive noise. This
is a great measure of privacy because it is independent of the actions of the adversary and only depends on
the choice of the additive privacy-preserving noise.
This framework can also be made mindful of the utility of the response by enforcing a constraint on
Q = E {g(w)} , (4)
where g : Rm → R≥0 is increasing in each component of w; therefore, the quality of response is inversely
proportional to Q. For instance, g(w) = w⊤w selects the trace of the co-variance matrix of the additive noise
to be inversely proportional to the quality or utility of response but the choice is not limited to co-variance.
Now, we can pose the problem of optimal privacy-preserving policies as
min
γ
I, (5a)
such that Q ≤ ρ. (5b)
The constraint Q ≤ ρ ensures that the quality of the privacy-preserving noise can be set in advance, which
is not possible in differential privacy.
3 Privacy and the Schro¨dinger’s Equation
To solve this optimization problem using the method in [21], we can form the Lagrangian
L =
∫
W
∥∥∥∥ ∂∂w log(pw(w))
∥∥∥∥
2
2
pw(w)dw + λ
(
ρ−
∫
W
g(w)pw(w)dw
)
+ µ
(∫
W
pw(w)dw − 1
)
,
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where λ ≤ 0 is the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to the inequality constraint Q ≤ ρ and µ ∈ R is the
Lagrange multiplier corresponding to the fact that the integration of the density pw(w) over W is equal to
one (because it is a probability density function). Using Theorem 5.3 in [12], the necessary condition for
minimizing the Lagrangian L is that
∇2ψ(w) − 1
4
(
µ+ λg(w)
)
ψ(w) = 0, ∀w ∈ W , (6)
where ψ(w) =
√
pw(w).
The optimality condition in (6) is the non-relativistic time-independent Schro¨dinger’s equation with
potential function proportional to µ+ λg(w) inside the set W and infinite potential outside. Note that (6)
can essentially be rewritten in the more familiar form of
[−∇2 + V (w)]ψ(w) = 0, (7)
where
V (w) =
{
(µ+ λg(w))/4, w ∈ W ,
+∞, w /∈ W . (8)
Minimization of the Fisher information and its relationship with the Schro¨dinger equation was previously
explored in [15, 26]. However, in those papers, the choice of Fisher information as a measure of disorder in
quantum mechanics was merely philosophical while, here, the choice is concretely motivated by the problem
of privacy.
As an example, consider m = 1 with W = [−a, a] and assume that g(w) = 0. This is identical to
the problem of a free quantum particle in an infinite square well. The solutions to the time-independent
Schro´dinger equation in this case is known to be of the form ψ(w) = c sin(npi(w − a)/(2a)) for all n ∈ N.
Note that c = 1/
√
a because the integration of the density pw(w) = ψ(w)
2 over W is equal to one. Hence,
pw(w) = sin
2(npi(w−a)/(2a))/a for all n ∈ N. As a result, it can be seen that I = n2pi2/a for all n ∈ N. As it
is desired to minimize I for ensuring the most privacy, it must be that n = 1 for the optimal privacy-preserving
policy. Another example, is to consider unbounded W = R and assume that g(w) = w2. In this case, simple
algebraic derivations show that the optimal privacy-preserving policy is pw(w) = exp(−w2/(2ρ))/
√
2piρ,
which is the Gaussian density function that is known to guarantee a relaxed version of differential privacy,
known as the approximate differential privacy [8, 11].
Finally, we would like to prove a fundamental result regarding the privacy-utility trade-off reminiscent of
the Heisenberg uncertainty principle. This is only shown for g(w) = w⊤w. It is known that J ≥ 1/E{w⊤w}
for any density function pw [29] and, as a result,
Privacy Principle: JQ ≥ 1. (9)
This inequality proves that, by decreasing J in order to improve privacy, the quality must be sacrificed by
increasing Q. This is underlying principle in privacy: there is no free lunch for privacy.
Finally, note that, although previously, the Fisher information has been used for measuring privacy
infringements in [13], parallels with quantum physics were not explored and the fundamental result regarding
the privacy-utility trade-off in (9) was also not investigated.
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we used the Fisher information as a measure of privacy to avoid unnecessary assumptions on
the private data. We proved that the optimal privacy-preserving additive noise, extracted by minimizing the
Fisher information, must follow the time-independent Schro¨dinger’s equation. We also derived a fundamental
trade-off between privacy and utility.
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